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Introduction
In the world described by Modigliani and Miller (1958) and Miller and Modigliani (1961) consumers value securities for what they deliver, rather than how they deliver it. Yet investors might regard cash distributions and capital gains as serving different purposes. On one hand, irrational investors might put dividends and capital gains into different mental accounts (Shefrin and Statman (1984) ). On the other hand, transaction costs of making homemade dividends, and tax considerations, might lead rational investors to favor (or avoid) dividends.
In addition to influencing asset allocation decisions, behavioral biases and market frictions could determine whether consumers participate in the security market. Moreover, if shocks to asset allocation and market participation decisions are correlated, then ignoring the link between them will cause a self-selection bias when regressing dividend yields on investors' characteristics (Heckman (1977) ). Depending on the direction of the bias, we could miss a dividend clientele or, worse, identify one that does not exist.
Using data from the Consumer Expenditure Survey (CEX), I assess whether market frictions and psychological biases keep investors out of financial markets; whether they lead investors to prefer dividends; and whether these two facts are related. The proposed methodology consists of two steps and is due to Heckman (1977) . In the first step, I run a probit regression to assess whether, and which, investor characteristics affect the decision to enter the market. The estimated parameters are then used to calculate the inverse Mills' ratio (which is a hazard function). In the second step, I regress dividends on several explanatory variables, including the inverse Mills ratio. This ratio accounts for the fact that, as investors' characteristics change, the composition of the observed sample might change systematically, an instance of sample selection bias.
The estimated model coefficients support the idea that market frictions and behavioral biases combine to affect US households' asset allocation and market participation decisions.
The main findings of the paper can be summarized as follows. First of all, shocks to dividends and market participation decisions are positively related (the beta on the inverse Mills ratio is positive). This significant relation means that a regression of dividends on household characteristics alone is affected by a self-selection bias.
With regard to the dividend equation, the relation between age and dividends is non linear. It is essentially flat for investors less than 40 years old (young accumulators), while it is increasing (as in Graham and Kumar (2006) ) for investors more than 40 years old. Unlike Graham and Kumar (2006) , I find a strong positive relation between log dividend and log income. This relation becomes even stronger when I account for self selection. While this relation is anomalous and hard to reconcile with theory, I find that it is entirely driven by uneducated households. Variables that proxy for household exposures to market frictions, and thus rationally explain dividend preferences, are also significant. In particular households with more income earners rely less on dividends, while the opposite happens when the main source of household income comes from a private business.
With regard to market participation, higher income, education, and house ownership increase the probability of joining financial markets. Age, although significant, is not a strong determinant of market participation. The number of income earners reduces the likelihood of market participation, which is consistent with the idea that the household is already well diversified and benefits less from holding securities. This paper is closely related to Graham and Kumar (2006) who use data from a discount broker to identify dividend clienteles based on age and income. They find that young and high-income households tend to avoid stocks that pay dividends. In addition to providing a tax-based explanation, they provide an explanation based on mental accounting.
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More 1 According to Shefrin and Statman (1984) , the reason why dividends and capital gains cannot be treated as perfect substitutes, i.e. mental accounting exists, comes from self-control problems (see also Thaler and generally, the present paper is related to a recent strand of the finance literature known as household finance, which, as put by Campbell (2006) , "asks how households use financial instruments to attain their objective". This literature also studies how market frictions and behavioral biases influence the ability of households to pursue their goals through asset allocation and market participation.
With regard to behavioral biases, Odean (1999) finds that discount brokerage customers engage in excessive trading 2 and display a disposition effect, i.e. a tendency to sell winners too soon and keep losers for too long. Baker, Nagel, and Wurgler (2007) study the effect of dividends on consumption. Their approach is to regress consumption on realized dividend income, total payoff (including dividends) and other control variables. They find that the coefficient on realized dividend income is positive and significant, and conclude that, contrary to classical models, the composition of payoffs does matter for consumption.
Low market participation is also puzzling, especially among wealthy households which benefit the most from diversification (Mankiw and Zeldes (1991) ). The 2001 Survey of Consumer Finances (SCF) reports that 52% of US households participate (directly or indirectly) in the US stock market. This is hard to reconcile with classic theory which predicts that (given the equity premium) households, no matter how risk averse, should hold stocks as soon as they start saving (Campbell (2006) ). Such puzzling behavior can be accommodated by the introduction of fixed participation costs, which can be either objective or psychological.
3 Shefrin (1981)). For instance, young investors concerned about their life cycle consumption, and aware of their lack of self control, seek mechanisms that promote savings and discourage dissavings, e.g. they build portfolios that pay low cash dividends. The same idea also explains why older people, who no longer have labor income, might rely on dividends to consume.
2 Barber and Odean (2000) show that this excessive trading makes the 20 percent of households that trade most often attain risk-adjusted returns of -10.3%. 3 Some households do not hold equity because they do not want to complicate the preparation of tax returns (Vissing-Jorgensen (2003) ). Hong, Kubik, and Stein (2004) find that household that are not socially active are less likely to hold stocks which suggest a preference for practices followed by the other members for age, income and wealth. He argues that education might lower both objective costs and the perception of psychological ones.
In addition to estimating a sample selection model, I contribute to the household finance literature by proposing new variables that proxy for household exposure to liquidity risk and, hence, for dividend preferences. The proposed variables are the number of income earners in the household, and a dummy indicating whether household income comes mainly from self employment. The intuition is that households with more diversified and less volatile income are less likely to have to disinvest, and incur transaction costs, in order to consume. To complete the model specification, I use housing tenure 4 and education as the key identifying variable in the participation equation.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. In section 2, I present the Consumer Expenditure Survey. In section 3, I introduce and specify sample selection models for dividend preferences. In section 4, I discuss the estimation results of the models. Section 5 concludes the study.
The Data
The data necessary to study household investment behavior is hard to obtain. As stated in Campbell (2006) , one reason is that households often guard their financial privacy more than their intimate affairs. In addition, many households have a complicated financial structure that is hard to reveal truthfully, even with the best intentions. The data in this study come from the Consumer Expenditure Survey (CEX), which is produced by the Bureau of Labor Statistics (BLS), and covers the period from January 1996 to December 2002.
of the community. 4 Cocco (2005) argues that the illiquid nature of the housing investment could lead young and poor investors to reduce their exposure to other securities.
The Consumer Expenditure Survey provides a continuous flow of information on the buying habits of American consumers and furnishes data to support periodic revisions of the Consumer Price Index. The data are organized in quarterly files and approximately 5,000
households are interviewed 3 months apart for 5 consecutive quarters (a trial interview is conducted in the first quarter). After the fifth interview, households are replaced by new ones. Using a stratified sample methodology, the BLS designs the survey to be representative of the US civilian population. However, attrition is quite substantial, with only about 70 percent of the households having data for all four interviews.
The CEX data are stored in four major files. I extract all the variables I need from the CEX family files which give information about household characteristics, income and aggregate expenditures. Although the focus of the survey is consumption, financial asset holdings and changes in these holdings over the preceding twelve months are collected in the fifth interview; dividends, income variables, and demographic data are collected in both the second and fifth interview and cover the twelve months prior to the interview date. In order to compare data over time, I express financial variables in December 2002 dollars using the consumer price index (variable CPIIND from CRSP.mcti file).
Household Selection Criteria
The CEX has many advantages over brokerage data. It has detailed data on household consumption, income, and demographics and is more representative of the US population.
Its weakness is that the data are self-reported and based mostly on memory, which is likely to introduce considerable measurement errors. To mitigate the effect of measurement errors, I
employ a few filters to screen out unusual observations. Following Baker, Nagel, and Wurgler (2007) , I impose the following three-stage filter:
1. exclude households with multiple consumer units (CU); 2. keep households whose family size has not changed between the first and last interview;
3. require that the marital status of the reference person be unchanged between the first and last interview.
In addition to the above filters, I discard observations for which responses on financial variables are flagged as 'B' or 'C' by the BLS, indicating non valid blanks. Upon inspection of the data, I find that the age of the head of the household can be as low as 15 and as high as 94. Aside, from legal issues, it is hard to believe that a 15-year old can be considered a reference person for a household. With this concern in mind, I drop observations for which the head of the household is less then 20 years old. However, the inclusion of these observations in the analysis would not change the results.
Finally, several households report $1 of financial holdings, and many more report $0 of dividends. I propose a methodology to re-impute these likely aberrant observations. I
5 These flags indicate lack of data that is either inconsistent with other reported answers, or arises from respondents' refusal to provide it. 6 Sensitive CU data are changed so that users will not be able to identify CUs who participated in the survey. Topcoding refers to the replacement of data in cases where the value of the original data exceeds prescribed critical values. Each observation that falls outside the critical value is replaced with a topcoded value that represents the mean of the subset of all outlying observations. report estimates for both raw and re-imputed data. I describe the data manipulation in the appendix. In addition to psychological biases, market participation and dividend preferences might originate from frictions faced by rational investors. In the presence of transaction costs and liquidity constraints, some investors might find it hard to convert assets into cash when they need it. If transaction costs are high, then spending from dividends avoids the costs of selling securities. A measure of the exposure to liquidity risks is represented by the number of income earners in the household. Assuming that earned income is less variable when more earners are present in the family, households with more diversified (labor) income are less likely to have to disinvest in order to consume. As a consequence, they can hold more illiquid assets and do not have to rely on dividends.
Household demographics
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The main source of income of a household might also play a role in investment decisions.
Depending on whether it comes from work in the public or private sector, or from a private business, household income might be more or less volatile and more or less correlated to shocks that hit the economy. To control for this feature, I construct a dummy variable that equals one if the main source of income comes from a private business, and zero otherwise.
The intuition for this variable is similar to that used for the number of income earners.
Furthermore, if the household's cash flows already resemble those of a growth firm, then the household will likely prefer to own dividend paying firms, which are characterized by more stable cash flows.
Finally, owner-occupied housing is the single most important asset in many investors portfolios and therefore it is likely to influence market participation. With regard to this point, Cocco (2005) argues that the illiquid nature of the housing investment could lead investors to reduce their exposure to other securities such as equity. securities. Column 5 reports the proportion of educated people in each cohort. As can be seen, the proportion of consumers with at least a college degree is substantially higher for asset holders. Not surprisingly, there is a positive correlation between education and income for all households. In column 2, I report the average number of earners in the households 7 This argument argument would be even stronger if assets that pay dividends are also characterized by higher liquidity. DeAngelo, DeAngelo, and Skinner (2004) provide ample evidence that during the sample period of this study dividends have been payed mainly by large, well known, and hence liquid, firms.
of a given cohort. There is a positive correlation between family income and the number of earners, suggesting that high-income families also have more diversified income.
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Column 3 reports the proportion of households that own the house where they live. Finally, column 4 shows that high income families are more likely to obtain their income from a private business.
Security Holders
The CEX contains information about four categories of financial assets. I focus on the CEX variable SECESTX which records households holdings of "stocks, bonds, mutual funds, and other such securities". Although some households report as zero their holdings of securities, they do report receiving dividends and trading such securities in the previous year, suggesting that they are in fact security holders (with incomplete financial information). To maximize the probability that I identify all security holders, I define them as those consumers for which at least one of the following CEX variables is different from zero: SECESTX; FININCX (dividends on SECESTX); COMPESECX (change in portfolio value from previous year);
PURCHSECX (dollar amount of securities bought during previous year); SELLSECX (dollar amount of securities sold during the previous year).
Some explanatory variables for dividend behavior are observable only when households self-select to participate in the financial market. One such variable is portfolio turnover, which is often used as a measure of liquidity (see for example Anshuman, Chordia, and
Subrahmanyam (2001)). I hypothesize two ways in which turnover can affect the demand for dividends. On one hand, a high turnover could signify that the assets held by the household are very liquid, in which case the household does not need to rely on dividends to consume because dividends could be costlessly fabricated if needed. On the other hand, investors that frequently turn over their portfolio might demand assets that pay dividend if 8 For completeness, in the third column I also report the average family size for each cohort.
they are perceived to be more liquid. Table 3 presents financial data for various age and income cohorts. As can be seen from column 1, portfolio size is increasing in age, which is consistent with a desire to smooth consumption over time. Turnover (column 2) is increasing in portfolio size and income.
An interesting feature of the table is that there is no detectable relation between dividends (column 4) and capital gains (column 3), and that negative performance is typically generated by negative capital gains. Column 5 of the table reports the proportion of households in each cohort holding a portfolio that pays dividends. The most striking evidence about dividend preferences is that US households dislike dividends. This evidence is consistent with the findings of Graham and Kumar (2006) that, as a whole, retail investors (as opposed to institutional investors) prefer capital gains to dividends.
Methodology
Sample Selection Models
Before allocating funds among the various available assets, an investor must decide if it is optimal to participate in the security market at all. Assets are held up to the point where the marginal cost of holding them is equal to the marginal benefit. However, if the marginal cost is never greater than, or equal to, the marginal benefit, then the agent decides that it is optimal to stay out of the market. The problem of selectivity (which results in truncation) surfaces if we consider that an actual figure for dividends can only be observed if the agent has decided that it is optimal to hold assets. To put this more formally, consider a structural model in which the participation equation is given by
and the dividend preference equation is given by
The variable Sec * i represents the net benefit of holding securities, while Div i is the dividend of the portfolio held by household i. w i is a vector of variables that influence the benefit of holding securities and x i is a vector of variables that can affect the demand of dividend-paying securities. Aside from identification issues, w i and x i can be equal, and generally these two vectors do share many elements. The variable Sec * i is not directly observable and, even if it was, it would be hard to measure marginal utility. What is observed is market participation, which is the manifestation of the fact that consumers find the benefit of holding securities greater than the costs. Define Sec i as the binary variable indicating market participation.
A dividend decision can be observed only if Sec i = 1. Assuming that the error terms are bivariate normal with standard deviations σ u and σ , and correlation ρ, sample selection takes place when the error terms in the two equations are correlated.
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Using the properties of the bivariate normal distribution, the conditional expectation that applies to the observed sample is given by:
where
, a fraction that involves the Normal pdf and cdf respectively. The correct model for the conditional expectation of the 9 Note that lack of correlation is the only form of independence under bivariate normality.
dividend yield is then
As can be seen from equation (3), in the presence of a sample selection problem, OLS estimation on a sample of security holders only (say from a discount broker) is subject to specification error leading to an omitted variable bias.
The parameters in equation (3) could in principle be estimated simultaneously with maximum likelihood. The two step procedure introduced by Heckman (1977) can be used instead. This procedure consists in the following steps:
1. estimate a probit model for the participation equation to obtain an estimate of of γ;
use this estimate to derive the inverse Mills ratio for each observation;
2. estimate β and β γ by regressing the dividend yield on the explanatory variables and the estimated Mills ratio.
The standard errors in this two-step model pose problems for at least two reasons. First, the additional variance that results from the generated regressor, namely the inverse Mills ratio, must be taken into account. Second, if there is indeed selection, then there is heteroskedasticity. To see this, note that values of x i that imply more or less truncation can also change the variance of the error term. Heckman (1979) includes a consistent variance estimator that deals with all these problems; this estimator can be found in Greene (2002) .
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From Table 3 we know that, even among asset holders, the variable Div i takes zero value most of the time. This is a substantial truncation (not subject to selectivity) that is likely to make OLS estimation inappropriate in the second step of the estimation. As an alternative to Heckman's estimation, I also use maximum likelihood to estimate a probit model for 10 Wooldridge (2001) also gives an excellent text book explanation of sample selection models and their estimation.
the dividend equation, in qhich I set Div i equal to one whenever dividends are positive in the original specification, and zero otherwise. This procedure sacrifices some efficiency for robustness.
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Model Specification
Sample selection models consist of two equations. The participation equation contains variables that predict whether the household enters the market, while the dividend equation includes variables that are believed to explain a possible preference for dividend. The variables in the the two equations can overlap. However, to insure that the model is correctly identified, it is recommended to leave at least one variable that predicts market participation out of the dividend equation. Ideally, such variable should be related to market participation and not to dividend preferences.
To choose the most appropriate specification, I conduct a preliminary graphical and non parametric analysis. Details are reported in the appendix. The variables included in the model are:
PARTICIPATION EQUATION (PROBIT)
• Binary dependent variable: equal to one if the household holds securities;
• Education Dummy: equal to one if the reference person has completed college;
• Age, Age Squared: age (in years) of the reference person in the household;
11 In the maximum likelihood estimation, for numerical reasons, ρ is not directly estimated. Directly estimated is ρ * ≡ atanh(ρ):
Thanks to the invariance property of maximum likelihood, the maximum likelihood estimator of ρ is obtained by inverting the function above. Notice that a test of whether ρ is zero is equivalent to a test of whether ρ * is zero.
• Log(Income): total household income after taxes;
• Earners: number of household members that earn income;
• Ownership Dummy: equal to one if the house is owned.
DIVIDEND EQUATION (OLS and PROBIT)
• Log(Dividend): this is the dependent variable; it is defined as dividend income obtained in the previous twelve months;
• Professional Dummy: equal to one if most of the income is earned with a management, professional, or administrative role;
• Retired Dummy: equal to one if the reference person has retired;
• Portfolio Size: amount of securities held by the household at the end of the period;
• Self Employed: dummy indicating whether the main source of income for the household is a private business;
• Age: a spline with two cutoffs (40, 65), generating three age variables;
• Turnover: sum of assets bought and sold over the previous twelve months;
• Tax: two dummies indicating whether the household has paid no tax, or more than $10,000 in taxes, in the previous twelve months;
• Log(Income), Earners: same as above. Table 5 reports correlations between the log of the dividend yield and the (continuous) regressors, with standard errors in parenthesis.
As can be seen, all the correlations are significant.
Empirical Findings
In this section, various linear and non linear models are estimated. For each of these models, 
Estimation of Basic Models
In this section I estimate models that do not account for sample selection. In the first four columns of Table 6 I report OLS estimates. In the last two columns I present Probit estimates to deal with the fact that dividends are themselves left censored. The dependent variable in the first four models is the logarithm of dividends. Column 1 and 2 use imputed dividends. In column 3 and 4 I only include those investors that report positive dividends.
In column 5 and 6, the dependent variable is binary: it equals one if dividends are reported and zero otherwise. The short regressions are as close as they can be to those reported in Table 2 of Graham and Kumar (2006) . The first and last two models should be seen as robustness checks.
in every specification. However the relationship between these two variables is not linear. While an increase in age of one year is associated with a 0.51%, or 0.42%, decrease in dividends for young investors (in models 3 an d 4), investors more than 40 years old receive more dividend income as they become older.
This is a key difference with Graham and Kumar (2006) who find a linear relation. They find that all investors seek dividends as they become older, while I find that young accumulators avoid dividends as they age, while older investors do just the opposite. However, both findings are in line with the existence of life cycle considerations behind the existence of an age clientele.
Income is significant and strongly related to dividends. As reported in the first 4 columns of Table 6 , a one per cent increase in income translates into an increase in dividends that goes from 0.38% to 0.53%. This finding is in sharp contrast to that of Graham and Kumar (2006) who find that low income leads to a higher dividend yield. They propose a tax explanation for the negative relation between income and dividends. Consistent with their story, in column 4 I find weak evidence that investors with no tax expenditures in the previous twelve months (NoTax ) receive more dividend income. Furthermore, investors for which tax expenditures in the previous twelve months exceed $10,000 (HighTax ) tend to have lower dividends. However, this evidence is insignificant and inconsistent across models, perhaps because tax expenditures are poorly measured in the CEX data set.
The professional and retired dummies, and portfolio turnover do not display a stable relation with dividends. These variables are also included in Graham and Kumar (2006) specification and are kept as controls. The relation between the log of dividend and the log of portfolio size is also positive, but dividends grow less than one-for-one with portfolio size.
This means that the actual relation between dividend yields and portfolio size (in logs) is negative. I provide graphical evidence of this fact in the appendix.
12 Insignificant estimates are in italics. Standard errors of the estimates are in parenthesis.
The friction measures that I propose in this study are also significant. Self-employed investors (Self-Employed ) tend to construct dividend paying portfolios in order to stabilize their cash flows, which are likely to be more volatile than those of workers employed in the private and public sector. Households, in which the number of income earners is higher do just the opposite. When a household member starts earning income, dividends decrease by 0.253% (column 4). This results imply that, as household income becomes more stable, households rely less on dividends.
The results discussed so far do not account for the possible relation between asset allocation and market participation. If such relation exists, then the estimates reported here are likely to be biased. In the next section I explore in detail the effect of sample selection. Table 7 and Table 8 present coefficient estimates of various sample selection models. Table 7 reports probit estimates for the participation equation underlying these models, while Table 8 reports estimates of the equation describing the relation between dividend and investors characteristics. The Inverse Mills Ratio is obtained in the first step of the estimation (Table 7) , and is used as an additional regressor in the second step (columns 1 through 4 in Table 8 ). The dividend equation and participation equation (for column 5 and 6 of Table 8) are estimated simultaneously.
Estimation of Sample Selection Models
As can be seen form Table 7 , the coefficient on education is positive and statistically significant in all models. This result is in accordance with the logistic regression estimated by Campbell (2006) . Although education plays an important role in the market participation decision, the implications of this variable are not straight forward. The fact that education predicts participation might lead us to conclude that investors learn to correct investment mistakes. In this case it would be reasonable to believe that market participants are somewhat more rational. However, Campbell (2006) suggests that education can lower the objective costs of market participation. He documents that (more educated) Swedish households diversify their wealth more efficiently and can thus expect to benefit more from market participation. In this case the decision not to participate does not imply that non-market participant are irrational. Future research in household finance should try to disentangle these two motives for market participation.
Housing ownership also influences market participation. Owning a house increases the probability that the investor decides to join the market. My finding is not entirely consistent with Cocco (2005) who claims that, due to investment in housing, younger and poorer investors have limited financial wealth to invest in stocks, which reduces the benefits of equity market participation.
The number of income earners in the household has a negative impact on market participation. This is consistent with the view that a more diversified income lowers the hedging benefit of holding securities.
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Age and income are also related to market participation, with age playing a marginal role. Table 8 reports results relative to the second estimation step of the model. The beta on the inverse Mills ratio is positive, indicating a positive correlation between the shocks of the participation and dividend equation.
14
The estimated correlations in models 5 and 6 are negative, but insignificant. The correction for the sample selection bias has a substantial amplifying effect on the estimated beta on income and on the number of earners. In particular, from column 4, we have that dividend grows more than one-for-one with income, which 13 This result is also consistent with the precautionary saving motive described by Gomes and Michaelides (2005) who find that participation rates are (optimally) increasing in risk aversion.
14 The t-test on the Inverse Mills Ratio (columns1-4) and on ρ (columns 5-6) are formal tests for the presence of selectivity bias. To see this for the Heckman-two-step estimation, note that the coefficient on the inverse Mills ratio term estimates σ ρ. Because σ is positive by definition, the sign of this coefficient is the same as the sign of ρ.
makes this relation even more anomalous.
The positive correlation between shocks to participation and dividend decisions says that a consumer that unexpectedly enters the market is also more likely to receive more dividends than expected. In other words, when an investor with low income (less likely to participate) enters the market (positive shock to participation), he or she is more likely to receive more dividends (positive shock to dividend decision). This selection bias, if not accounted for, naturally tends to flatten the relation between dividends and income. Hence, simple OLS regression would under-estimate the already anomalous effect of income on dividends. The same story is valid, to a less extent for age.
Education and Dividend Preferences
To shed light on the relation between income and dividends, I also consider the role that education plays in portfolio decisions. Since education is likely related to innate, or acquired, reasoning abilities, it could be that the relation between income and dividends for a particular investor might depend on his, or her, attained education. I therefore re-estimate several models in which the education dummy appears alone, and as an interaction with income.
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The results of the estimation are reported in Table 9 . Table 9 reports the long regressions of Table 6 and Table 8 , extended to include the education variables.
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The first two models report OLS estimates for both the long and truncated samples. Columns 3 and 4 report estimates for the Heckman two-step models for both samples as well. Finally column 5 reports estimates for the probit estimation subject to sample selection. The main point of the table is that the positive relation between income 15 I do not consider interactions between the age spline and education because this would create 6 ageeducation categories, some of which with very few observations. This would make estimation results too unreliable. 16 The participation equations are unchanged and are those of The estimates reported in Table 9 allow me to identify two categories of investors. Those who respond to income (and age to some extent) and those who respond only to market frictions. Education seems to be a powerful separator of these two groups and could act in two ways. On one hand, consumers that complete at least college might be able to remove (through education) some of the biases that affect their investment decisions. On the other hand, college and graduate studies might select those consumers less likely to display such behavioral biases. Although, disentangling these two channels would be interesting and could help set policy, this investigation is beyond the scope of this paper.
Income Endogeneity
A potential problem in the reported regressions is that total income could be endogenous. It might be that income is high because of dividends, since dividend income is part of household income. Furthermore, if dividend income is very high, then a consumer (that enjoys leisure) might decide to exit the labor market, making dividends the only source of income. To address this problem, I rerun the regressions using income earned by the household in the year before entering the survey. Past income is related to current income, but does not include current dividends and, thus, is a valid instrument. The results however are very similar. Therefore, I conclude that they are not driven by endogeneity.
This paper shows that market participation and asset allocation are intimately related investment decisions, and that not accounting for sample selection under-estimates certain investment anomalies. Therefore behavioral studies on dividend preferences should consider consumers whose biases are not observable.
I propose new variables that proxy for households' exposure to risks related to market frictions. These factors can rationalize the demand for dividends. Furthermore, I identify two important segments of the population. The educated segment comprises households who seek dividends in response to market frictions. The uneducated segment includes households who seek dividends also in response to higher income. The behavior of the latter group is an investment anomaly.
A Data Manipulation
In this section, I explain how I have manipulated some data points that a likely to be generated by reporting errors. For instance, several households report as $1 the value of their financial holdings. These are clearly misreported data, especially if one compares them to reported dividends by the same household, often exceeding several thousands of dollars.
Due to their leverage, these observations (if kept as they are) would introduce distortions in the estimation. One solution would be to just drop these observations. However, this could alter the probit estimation of the participation equation. There are two types of data that I have modified. I describe the modifications below.
• Imputing Security Holdings. I replace values of asset holding below $10 with values reported by similar investors. The imputed value is the median asset holdings of the education-age-income group to which the investor belongs. The cut offs for the groups are those used in the definition of the education dummy (2 groups, i.e. educated Vs uneducated), and those reported in Table 1 (3 by 3) , yielding 18 cohorts. I only report results for imputed data.
• Imputing Dividends. I replace values of dividends equal to $0 with values reported by similar investors. In this case too, the imputed value is the median dividend of the education-age-income group to which the investor belongs. I report results for both truncated and imputed data.
In both cases, the median is calculated on the cohorts purged of the observations that need to be imputed.
B Model Specification: Assessing Linearity
The dependent variable and several regressors are expressed in logs. Having just dividends or dividend yield would introduce a censoring which would complicate the analysis. Moreover, the log specification helps reduce the influence of several outliers. To asses linearity of the relation between dividends and other explanatory variables, I have conducted a preliminary graphical and non-parametric analysis. Figure 1 and Figure 2 give a graphical representation of the relation between dividends and some key (continuous) variables of the model. The subplots on the left of each figure consider the logarithm of dividend, while the subplots on the right consider the logarithm of dividend yield.
In Figure 1 , I report scatter plots with a linear fit. Notice the presence of some outlier that have managed to pass all the imposed filters. However these outliers turn out to have low influence on the estimation results since they lie near the trajectory of the trend in the data. Given the large sample size and the relatively high dispersion of the data, the graphs in Figure 1 are not able to reveal potential non linearities. Therefore, I implement a non parametric (Lowess) procedure to examine non linearities.
As can be seen from Figure 2 (just focus on the left plots), dividends and income are positively related. The same relation holds for dividend and portfolio size, although the lower end of the relation is slightly distorted by the outlier identified in Figure 1 . Notice that dividends increase less than one for one with portfolio size. This is why the relation between the logarithm of the dividend yield and the logarithm of portfolios size is negative.
Finally the relation between dividends and age appears to be non linear. To account for such non-linearity I construct a spline with cutoffs at the age of 40 and 65. This yields three age regressors which are constructed to give a continuous and piece-wise linear relation between age and dividends.
Finally, notice that, aside from numerical issues, there is not difference between a spec-ification with log(dividend) and one with log(dividend yield).
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. I opt for a specification with log(dividends) because, by avoiding ratios, it likely to be more stable numerically. In unreported regressions which use the dividend yield, the only difference is on the size and sign of the coefficient on portfolio size. These results are available upon request.
17 As long as we include the logarithm of portfolio size on the right-hand side. Scatter plots and linear interpolation of the logarithm of dividends (subplots on the left), and of dividend yield (subplots on the right), against 3 explanatory variables. Income is total household income after taxes. Age is the age of the reference person in the household. Portfolio Size is the amount of securities held by the household at the end of the period. Non parametric regression (lowess) and linear interpolation of the logarithm of dividends (subplots on the left), and of dividend yield (subplots on the right), against 3 explanatory variables. Income is total household income after taxes. Age is the age of the reference person in the household. Portfolio Size is the amount of securities held by the household at the end of the period. This table presents Heckman-two-step estimates in columns 1 through 4 and estimates for probit, subject to self selection bias, in column 5 and 6. Columns 2 and 4 use the sample without imputed dividends. The dependent variable in the first four models is the logarithm of dividends. In the last two models the dependent variable is one if dividends are positive and zero otherwise. Turnover is the sum of assets bought and sold over the previous twelve months and. Income is total household income after taxes. Age is the age of the reference person in the household. Port Size is the amount of securities held by the household at the end of the period. Earners is the number of household members that earn income. Professional Dummy indicates whether most of the income is earned with a management, professional, or administrative role. Retired Dummy equals one if the reference person in the household has retired. Self Employed equals one if the if main source of income for the household is a private business. NoTax equals one if the household has paid no taxes, and HighTax equals one if the household has paid more than $10,000 in taxes in the previous twelve months. Insignificant estimates are in italics. Standard errors of the estimates are in parenthesis. 
